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Modern bioethics is clearly dominated by deontologists who believe 
that we have some way of identifying morally correct and incorrect acts 
or rules besides taking account of their consequences. Robert M. 
Veatch is probably the most outspoken of those numerous modern 
medical ethicists who agree in rejecting all forms of teleological, 
utilitarian o r  consequentialists ethical theories. This paper will examine 
his critique of utilitarianism and show that the utilitarianism of John 
Stuart Mill is either not touched at all by his critique or can bedefended 
against it. 1 am convinced that the dominant deontological majority is 
mistaken and that a utilitarian theory of moral action very much like 
Mill’s is precisely what is needed by modern medical ethics and by those 
medical practitioners who are resolved to practice medicine in a 
reasonable and morally acceptable manner. 
Part 1. Veatch on Mill’s Basic Moral Principle 
I would like to  point out initially that Veatch’s critique of Mill’s 
utilitarianism has not kept up with or taken account ofsome of the most 
recent scholarly work that has been done on Mill. In his recent A 
Theory of Medical Ethics, Veatch classifies Mill with Bentham as one 
who adopts as his “basic moral principle” what turns out to be the 
fundamental action-guiding norm of act utilitarianism, i.e. that we are 
morally obligated to  perform that act which will maximize good 
consequences for those affected. Veatch states what he often calls both 
“the utilitarian principle”’ and “the principle of beneficence,”2 as 
follows, clearly including Mill: 
. . . one might be tempted to say-along with Bentham, Mill, and the utilitarians-that 
the society should adopt as  its basic moral principle the one which states that the right 
course is that which will produce at least as much net benefit as alternative courses . . . It 
seems to require that for every choice in a human life, one is obligated to choose the one 
course that would maximize net aggregate total consequences.3 
Many contemporary medical ethicists, including Veatch, who reject 
utilitarianism make the unwarranted assumptions that all utilitarians 
are alike in accepting the duty to maximize goodness as the most 
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fundamental moral principle and in assuming that all utilitarians are 
committed to applying their fundamental moral principles in exactly 
the same way. Wholesale condemnations of utilitarianism fail to 
recognize that there are many forms of and applications of utili- 
tarianism. Mill himself insisted that utilitarians were united in their 
“recognition of utility as a standard, not any particular way of applying 
it.”4 There are some very important differences in the way in which the 
Principle of Utility gets formulated and in the way in which it enters into 
utilitarian theories of moral obligation. 
Mill’s own “basic moral principle” was not identical with the 
Principle of Utility. Contrary to Veatch’s assumption, Mill did not 
subscribe to  a maximizing utilitarianism like modern act or rule 
utilitarianism. Mill did nor believe that we have a moral obligation to 
maximize goodness or to be benevolent in Veatch’s sense, though 
Veatch no doubt is in accord with the standard textbook stereotype of 
Mill which has never been based on a careful reading of Mill. However, 
a number of important studies of Mill have been published in the last 
decade or so by such scholars as D. G. Brown, David Lyons and  Gerald 
F. Gaus which show quite conclusively that on the whole Mill was not a 
maximizing moral utilitarian at  all.5 The mistaken belief that he 
adopted the maximization of goodness as his basic moral principle has 
been based primarily on the assumption that Mill’s basic moral 
principle was identical with the Principle of Utility. However, Mill 
actually treated the Principle of Utility as the first principle of his 
general axiology or “Teleology,”or “the Art of Life,”as he called it in 
his Logic.6 As such it was the “source,” “foundation,” “criterion” or  
“test” of morals, but he repeatedly insisted that many special 
considerations had to  be introduced in order to derive a theory of 
morals from the basic axiom of the Art of Life. 
To  make a long story short, Mill’s Principle of Utility, the first 
principle of the Art of Life, is best paraphrased as: Actions, virtues, 
rules and  other instrumental goods are desirable (and in that sense 
correct o r  right) t o  theextent that they tend to promote the happiness of 
the greatest number of persons o r  sentient beings; and they are 
undesirable to  the extent that they tend to  promote the reverse of 
happiness. By contrast, Mill’s fundamental moral principle is best 
paraphrased as: We are morally obligated only to  abstain from 
inflicting harm, to actively prevent harm, to  actively provide for other 
persons or  sentient beings certain minimal essentials of any sort of well 
being whatsoever, and beyond that to contribute a decent minimum to 
charity. Among the minimal essentials for persons are such things as 
life, liberty, security, individuality and self-development, food and 
shelter, basic health care, basic education, equality or  opportunity to 
pursue happiness, etc. Our rights correlate with these minimal essential 
goods, as will be explained later. The majority of moral duties, i.e. 
liberty-restricting duties to be compelled by society, which Mill 
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recognized were clearly negative duties t o  avoid and prevent harm. This 
comes out repeatedly in all the works in which Mill discussed the topic 
of moral obligation. To give one conspicuous example: “The sole end 
for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self- 
protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is 
t o  prevent harm to others.”’ In his earlier Death, Dying and the 
Biological Revolution, Veatch agreed with W. D. Ross that “to give 
special consideration to harms over benefits is t o  deviate from the 
simple utilitarianism of Mill and Moore.”* However true this may be of 
Moore, no one who has taken the trouble to read Mill could have 
written such a statement! This is one of the main problems with today’s 
deontological critics of Mill. Most of them seem never to  have read 
Mill. 
Mill’s Principle of Utility contains a maximizing view only of what is 
ideally desirable, not of what is morally obligatory. Now our problem 
is, how do  we get from the one to the other, from a maximizing view of 
what is desirable to a minimizing view of what is morally obligatory? 
What special considerations must be introduced before the Principle 
can function properly as the “foundation” of a minimizing theory of 
moral obligation? 
According to Mill, there are at least two necessary conditions which 
must be taken into account in order to identify what he called “the 
domain of moral duty.”9 First of all, only those acts are morally 
obligatory which are so essential to the well being of other persons or 
sentient creatures that society is justified in requiring and enforcing 
them through the use of those negative reenforcers which Mill called the 
“sanctions”of morality. The most important ofthese sanctions were the 
pain-inducing motivators of adverse public opinion,’O legal coercion 
and guilty conscience, especially the latter.” Bringing these into play 
counted as “punishment” in Mill’s very broad sense of the term. The 
costs of initiating, teaching and enforcing these sanctions have to  be 
taken into account in determining which acts are to  count as morally 
obligatory. Once these costs are counted, Mill was convinced that only a 
relatively few desirable acts can be classified as moral obligations, i.e. as 
acts that society justifiably could coercively require of its members. 
Other desirable acts fall into non-moral domains such as those of 
manners, aesthetic tastes, prudential well being or expediency, exalted 
heroism, and saintly self sacrifice. These can be positively encouraged 
and promoted, but the price of “punishing”persons for non-conformity 
in these areas is too high. There are many passages in which Mill 
developed his idea that correlation with justifiable sanctions, i.e. those 
worth the price, is a necessary condition for identifying moral 
obligations. In the following discussion, the class of desirable acts and 
even of moral virtues is far larger than the class of morally required acts 
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and the Principle of Utility itselfrequires this narrowing of theprovince 
of positive moral duty. 
Utilitarian morality fully recognises the distinction between the province of positive duty 
and that of virtue, but maintains that the standard and rule of both is the general interest. 
From the utilitarian point of view, the distinction between them is the following:-There 
are many acts, and a still greater number of forbearances, the perpetual practice of which 
by all is so necessary to the general well-being, that people must be held to it compulsorily, 
either by law, or by social pressure. These acts and forbearances constitute duty. Outside 
these bounds, there is the innumerable variety of modes in which the acts of human beings 
are either a cause, or a hindrance, of good to their fellow-creatures, but in regard to which 
it is, on the whole, for the general interest that they should be left free; being merely 
encouraged, by praise and honour, to the performance of such beneficial actions as are not 
sufficiently stimulated by benefits flowing from them to the agent himself. This larger 
sphere is that of Merit or Virtue.12 
Again, in writing of the idea of “moral obligation in general,” Mill 
explained that: 
We d o  not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be 
punished in some way or other for doing it-if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow 
creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the real 
turning point of the distinction between moralityand simple expediency. It isa part of the 
notion of duty in every one of its forms that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfill 
it. Duty is a thing which may be exocredfrom a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we 
think that it may be exacted from him, we do not call it his duty.13 
For Mill, a second necessary condition for the identification of 
morally right or wrong acts is that they should always be correlated with 
concrete rules. Mill’s position on such rules is actually quite complex. 
He insisted that “secondary principles” are always involved in 
identifying morally obligatory acts, that in no case can we identify such 
acts through a direct application of the fundamental axiom of morality, 
much less the Principle of Utility itself. Mill claimed that “Whatever we 
adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require subordinate 
principles to apply it,”’4 and that “There is no case of moral obligation 
in which some secondary principle is not involved.”l5 In some cases, the 
rules involved are those already existing rules already recognized by 
society; society will exact its revenge for violating its rules whether they 
are good rules or not. In the real world, existing rules cannot be ignored 
or flaunted without peril. As a moral or social reformer, however, the 
utilitarian can propose and actively lobby for the adoption of ideal rules 
which would better protect persons from harm and promote the 
minimal essentials of well being.16 Needless to say, in this realm of 
application, there is ample room for legitimate disagreement con- 
cerning the content of the ideal rules. It is as true in our day as it was in 
Mill’s that “the received code of ethics is by no means of divine right; 
and that mankind have still much t o  learn as to the effects of actions on 
the general happiness.”l7 
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Secondary rules like “do not steal, except . . .” or “do not kill, 
except.  . .”are vital t o  any working morality. They enable us to know 
what others can reasonably expect of us.’* They are readily available as 
probability guides when sudden decisions are called for that d o  not 
allow time for c a l c ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  At their best, they are based upon aeons of 
past experience concerning the general kinds of human acts that tend to 
result in harm to others.20 
Ideal rules are justified when their benefits clearly exceed their costs, 
i.e. when the harm and suffering prevented by them clearly exceeds the 
harm and  suffering caused by the supporting sanctions and by the 
societal effort which must be expended in getting the rules adopted and 
teaching and learning the rules. Thus they are grounded in the Principle 
of Utility, for, unlike the rules of prudence, it is “for the good of 
mankind that (we) be held accountable”*[ for obedience to such rules. 
Mill was greatly concerned that his moral theory be applicable in the 
real world, taking all the frailties of ordinary people into account. For  
this reason, he insisted that even ideal moral rules had to  be relatively 
simple so that they could be easily taught and learned.22 This meant that 
although they could incorporate a limited list of explicit qualifications 
and exceptions, they could not incorporate a n  indefinitely lengthy list of 
them. Even the exceptions like stealing to prevent one’s family from 
starving had to be justified on  the ground that as a class they were less 
harmful t o  the essential well being of others than obedience to the 
unqualified rule itself would be.*3 
Since they cannot have all the legitimate exceptions written into them 
in a working morality, even ideal rules will come into conflict with one 
another a t  times. It is at  this point that the Principle of Utility again 
comes into play, for conflicts of rules are to  be decided in favor of that 
rule which least violates the Principle. As Mill acknowledged, 
It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human affairs, that rules of 
conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions . . . There exists no moral 
system under which there d o  not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation . . . If 
utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide 
between them when their demands are incompatible . , . We must remember that only in 
these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles 
should be appealed to.24 
It is most important, however, that we carefully interpret the precise 
nature of Mill’s appeal t o  the Principle of Utility in resolvingconflicts of 
moral rules. Within the “province” of morality, there is no moral 
obligation to maximize goodness or  t o  be benevolent in that sense. 
Thus, acting on  the rule which maximizes positive benefits cannot be a 
morally enforcable resolution to such a conflict, though this inter- 
pretation is commonplace. The morally correct resolution to the 
problem of conflicting rules is rather the minimizing option, i.e. that we 
should act on that rule which involves the least infliction of harm, the 
prevention of the most harm, or  the best provision of minimalessentials 
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of well being. A minimizing moral utilitarianism can require no more 
than this. We must remember that Mill’s position incorporates no  
moral rules designed to  maximize happiness o r  well being and that such 
rules thus cannot be among those which come into conflict with one 
another within the province of morals. Most legitimate moral rules are 
negative rules which forbid the infliction of harm, though there are 
some additional rules which require positive acts calculated to  prevent 
harm and to promote minimal well being. As he wrote in On Liberty, 
I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but i t  must be utility in the 
largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those 
interests, 1 contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, 
only in respect to those actions of each, which concerns the interests of other people. If any 
one does an act hurtful to others, there is apr ima fociecase for punishing him, by law. or, 
where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also 
many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to 
perform; such as, to give evidence in a court ofjustice; to bear his fair share in the common 
defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he 
enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving 
a fellow creature’s life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things 
which whenever it is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible 
to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by 
his inaction. and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter 
case. i t  is true, requires a much more cautious exercise ofcompulsion than the former. To 
make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for 
not preventing evil, is. comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet there are many cases 
clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception.25 
As David Lyons has pointed out, we must be very careful not t o  
interpret “positive acts for the benefit of others”in this passage t o  mean 
“acts for the positive benefit of others.”26 All of Mill’s examples here 
deal with abstaining from or  preventing harm. In his doctrine of 
rights,2’ Mill extended the domain of moral obligations to cover acting 
to provide others with minimalessentials of well being, but none of this 
adds up to a moral obligation to  maximize happiness or well being, 
however desirable that might otherwise be. Mill recognized no  such 
socially enforcable obligation, either t o  oneself or to others. In 
explaining his utilitarianism to Thomas Carlyle in 1834, Mill wrote that 
“I have never, at least since I had any convictions of my own, belonged 
to the benevolentiary, soup-kitchen school.”2s 
In light of the foregoing considerations, it is evident that Professor 
Veatch’s most elemental mistake is that of classifying John Stuart Mill 
as a maximizing act utilitarian who adopted what Veatch calls “the 
principle of benevolence” as his most basic moral principle. 
Part 11: Veatch on Supererogation, Moralizing All of Life, 
and Promise Keeping 
Robert M. Veatch offers a number of specific criticisms of what he 
takes to be the utilitarian position common to Mill, Bentham and others 
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in his A Theory of Medical Erhics. I shall now turn to  these. I will show 
that Mill’s position does not succumb to any of these criticisms. Though 
he acknowledges that he has taken his specific criticisms from another 
author,*9 Veatch has conveniently summarized five of his basic 
theoretical objections to utilitarianism as follows: 
Utilitarians face the problem of choosing among various competing ways of producing 
the greatest net good. None of them squares with the obvious, if simplistic, psychology of 
egoism. Moreover, many of the utilitarianisms seem to lead to highly implausible, 
counterintuitive implications: that superhuman acts normally referred to as superero- 
gatory are morally required provided they produce even slightly more good on balance 
than alternative actions; that even trivial choices among actions are elevated to moral 
obligations if they produce even slightly greater benefit (the choice among breakfast 
cereals, for example); that the only reason to keep promises is because keeping them 
produces or tends to produce the best consequences; that punishment should be meted out 
on the basis of the consequences rather than on the basis of who deserves the punishment; 
and that the distribution of the benefits and harms counts for nothing in the concept of 
justice except as it has an impact on total aggregate consequences.10 
Now we shall consider these five objections in some detail. 
(1) Objection 1 is that utilitarianism cannot allow a place for 
supererogation, i.e., for the recognition of desirable actions which 
clearly go beyond the call of moral duty. Veatch explained that the 
Principle of Utility 
is a principle that seems to require perfection in every moment in order for one to  lead a 
moral life. But most people feel that they need not always conduct themselves in a way that 
will produce more good results on balance that other course. While producing good is 
often considered relevant to deciding what is morally required, there are times when doing 
what will produce the most good is supererogatory. that is, morally commendable but not 
necessarily morally required.” 
Those who take the trouble actually to  read Mill himself will find that 
he too maintained that many saintly and heroic acts fall outside the 
sphere of the morally required but inside the sphere of the morally 
commendable. Mill insisted that the class of morally virtuous acts and 
dispositions is far broader than the class of morally obligatory acts and 
dispositions. Furthermore, for Mill, the Principle of Utility did not 
require that supererogatory acts be morally obligatory. Instead, the 
Principle excluded such acts from the domain of moral obligation 
precisely because the cost of coercing people to  be saints and heroes a t  
all times is far too great. The Principle allows us to identify such acts as 
highly desirable, as deeds to be positively encouraged, but not as deeds 
to  be enforced by negative moral sanctions or identified by compulsory 
moral rules. In his 1865 essay on “The Later Speculations of M. 
Comte,” Mill accused Auguste Comte of being “a morality-intoxicated 
man. Every Question with him is one of morality, and no  motive but 
that of morality is permitted.”32 Mill insisted that Comte’s position: 
makes the same ethical mistake as the theory of Calvinism, that every act in life should be 
done for the glory of God, and that whatever is not a duty is a sin. It does not perceive that 
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between the region of duty and that of sin there is an intermediate space, the region of 
positive worthiness. It is not good that persons should be bound, by other people’s 
opinion, to d o  everything that they would deserve praise for doing. There is a standard of 
altruism to which all should be required to come up, and a degree beyond it which is not 
obligatory, but meritorious. It is incumbent on every one to restrain the pursuit of his 
personal objects within the limits consistent with the essential interests of others. What 
those limits are, it is the province of ethical science to determine; and to keep all 
individuals and aggregations of individuals within them, is the proper office of 
punishment and of moral blame. If in addition to fulfilling this obligation, persons make 
the good of others a direct object of disinterested exertions, postponing or sacrificing to it 
even innocent personal indulgences, they deserve gratitude and honor, and are fit objects 
of moral praise. So long as they are in no way compelled to this conduct by any external 
pressure, there cannot be too much of it; but a necessarycondition is its spontaneity; since 
the notion of happiness for all, procured by the self-sacrifice of each, if the abnegation is 
really felt to be a sacrifice, is a contradiction. Such spontaneity by no means excludes 
sympathetic encouragement; but the encouragement should take the form of making 
self-devotion pleasant, not that of making everything else painful. The object should be to 
stimulate services to humanity by their natural rewards; not to render the pursuit of our 
own good in any other manner impossible, by visiting it with the reproaches of othersand 
of our own conscience.J’ 
As a rule of conduct, to be enforced by moral sanctions, we think no more should be 
attempted than to prevent people from doing harm to others, or omitting to do  such good 
as they have undertaken. Demanding no more than this, society, in any tolerable 
circumstances, obtains much more; for the natural activity of human nature, shut out 
from all noxious directions, will expand itself in useful ones. This is our conception of the 
moral rule prescribed by the religion of Humanity. But above this standard there is an 
unlimited range of moral worth, up to the most exalted heroism, which should be fostered 
by every positive encouragement, though not converted into an obligation. It is as  much a 
part of ou r  scheme as of M. Comte’s, that the direct cultivation of altruism, and the 
subordination of egoism to it, far beyond the point of absolute moral duty, should be one 
of the chief aims of education, both individual and collective . . , Nor can any pains taken 
be too great, to form the habit,and develop thedesire, ofbeing useful to othersand to the 
world, by the practice, independently of reward and of every personal consideration, of 
positive virtue beyond the bounds of prescribed duty.J4 
In recognizing a realm of positive worthiness, moral worth, moral 
praise, positive virtues, habits, desires, etc. lying “beyond the bounds of 
prescribed duty,” Mill perpetuated an ambiguity in the concept of the 
“moral” which exists in ordinary discourse. There is an apparent 
incoherence between our regarding and praising the saint and the hero 
as an exceptionally moral person precisely because their deeds exceed 
morality, i.e. go beyond the call of duty. This merely means that our 
concept of moral virtue is broader than our concept of moral 
obligation. As Mill put it, “Utilitarian morality fully recognizes the 
distinction between the province of positive duty and that of virtue, but 
maintains that the standard and rule of both is the general intere~t.”’~ 
Clearly, Mill’s utilitarianism does not yield to Veatch’s first objection. It 
definitely can and does make a place for supererogation; it will 
unquestionably allow us to distinguish between what is “morally 
commendable but not necessarily morally required.”36 A duty to “Do 
good” is not equivalent to a duty to “Maximize good.” 
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(2) Veatch’s second objection to  utilitarianism is that it moralizes the 
whole of life, that “even trivial choices among actions are elevated t o  
moral obligations if they produce even slightly greater benefit (the 
choice among breakfast cereals, for e ~ a m p l e ) . ” 3 ~  This objection, like 
the preceding, is predicated upon the unwarranted assumption that 
Mill’s was a maximizing utilitarianism. We have seen that Mill 
castigated Comte for being a morality intoxicated man for whom every 
question was a moral question. We have already identified a broad 
domain of “positive worthiness,” i.e. of desirable heroic and saintly 
behaviors and virtues that for Mill were not “elevated to  moral 
obligations.” It should be clear enough by now that in a minimizing 
utilitarianism there are many non-trivial as well as trivial choices which 
cannot be classified as moral duties because the price of societal 
coercion is these areas would be too  high, because the social adoption 
and  enforcement of action-guiding rules requiring such behaviors 
would be counter productive. It is usually best for mankind that liberty 
be the rule rather than moral constaint. 
The main thrust of Veatch’s second objection seems to  focus on 
self-interested acts. The example of “the choice among breakfast 
cereals” seems to  illustrate the charge that utilitarianism elevates even 
trivial prudential choices to the domain of moral obligations. In 
response, we must point out that Mill’s utilitarianism clearly dis- 
tinguished between prudential obligations and moral obligations. The 
Principle of Utility is just as much the basic axiom of Prudence as it is of 
Morals. With respect to matters of self-interest, it is desirable that we 
optimize our  own happiness, but this by no means entails that acting to  
d o  so is morally obligatory, i.e. that such acts are ideally correlated with 
behavioral rules that should be supported by social negative re- 
enforcers. On thecontrary, Mill took the rather extreme position that as 
rational adults we have no moral obligations to ourselves whatsoever. 
Our natural self interest and  personal self knowledge serve well enough 
to  motivate us to pursue our  own happiness or  well being without being 
coerced by society to  d o  so. Prudence is unquestionably something t o  be 
positively encouraged but not something to be negatively required by 
others. Again, it is the Principle of Utility which requires that we not 
moralize prudence, even in matters of utmost importance, not to 
mention trivialities. It is best that some areas of life be left to the 
individual and be free from societal coercion, i.e. best that we not 
moralize the whole of life, but that liberty be the rule. As Mill explained 
in On Liberty, in matters of self interest it is not “for the good of 
mankind that (we) be held accountable to them.”-” In more detail, 
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own 
way, so long as we d o  not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to  
obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and 
spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to  live as seems good to 
themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.39 
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I am the last person to undervalue :he self-regarding virtues; they are only second in 
importance, if even second. to  the social. It is equally the business of education to cultivate 
both. But even education works by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion, 
and it is by the former only that, when the period of education is past, the self-regarding 
virtues should be inculcated. Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the 
better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They 
should be forever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties, and 
increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish, elevating 
instead of degrading, objects and contemplations.40 
In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is necessary that general rules 
should for the most part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to 
expect; but in each person’s own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free 
exercise. Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be 
offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others; but he, himself, is the final judge. All 
errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning,are far outweighed by the 
evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good.4’ 
Again, it is clear that although Mill’s utilitarianism did recognize the 
importance of prudence and did allow for the positive encouragement 
of such by others, he nevertheless did not elevate obligations of self 
interest to the status of moral obligations, i.e. obligations to  be 
coercively constrained by others. Thus, Mill’s position is clearly not 
vulnerable to Veatch’s second objection. 
(3) Veatch’s third objection is that utilitarianism accounts in- 
adequately for the duty of promise keeping because “the only reason to  
keep promises is because keeping them produces or  tends to produce the 
best  consequence^."^^ It is tempting to respond with the question: Well, 
what other reason is there? Of course, there is ananswer, one which was 
popularized by Sir David Ross, who wrote that 
When a plain man fulfills a promise because he thinks he ought to do so, it seems clear 
that he does so with no thought of its total consequences, still less with any opinion that 
these are likely to be the best possible. He thinks in fact much more of the past than of the 
future. What makes him think it right to a d  in a certain way is the fact that he has 
promised to d o  so-that and, usually. nothing m0re.4~ 
Although Veatch does not explain his objection respecting promise 
keeping, his point seems to be that the proper reason for keeping 
promises is that they have been made, not that they are likely to  have the 
best consequences. Since utilitarianism looks entirely at future 
consequences, it cannot account for such a “past-looking’’ reason, as 
innumerable critics since Ross have echoed. 
There are at  least three important elements in a proper reply to  this 
sort of criticism from the point of view of Mill’s minimizing 
utilitarianism. Most importantly, any utilitarian who is not a sheer idiot 
will realize that many things which we did in the past make a difference 
in the present and the future. Mill firmly believed that as utilitarians we 
can and should keep promises because we made them in the past, 
though this is never the whole story, In deciding whether to keep a 
promise, the utilitarian never finds himself in the situation of deciding 
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which course of action would be best just as if a promise had never been 
made. The reason for this is that past promises have the significant 
effect of raising the present and future expectations of the promisee and 
others who know the promise was made. Thus, the future consequences 
of performing an act that breaks a promise are never the same as 
performing the same act in the absence of having made that promise in 
the past. 
The second thing that needs to  be said about Veatch’s objection 
concerning promise keeping is that Mill did not justify promise keeping 
on the grounds that doing so “produces or tends to produce the best 
consequences,” though no doubt much has been and could be said in 
favor of this maximizing position.44 Mill’s justification was tied not to a 
moral duty of positive benvolence but rather t o  nonmaleficence. Mill 
thought promise breaking to  be morally wrong because of its 
“connection with hurt or injury,” as he explained: 
The important rank, among human evils and wrongs, of the disappointment of 
expectation is shown in the fact that it constitutes the principle criminality of two such 
highly immoral acts as a breach of friendship and a breach of promise. Few hurts which 
human beings can sustain are greater, and none wound more, than when that on which 
they habitually and with full assurance relied fails them in the hour of need; and few 
wrongsaregreater than this mere withholding ofgood; none excite more sentiment, either 
in the person suffering or in a sympathizing spe~ta tor .~s  
Although Mill recognized no general moral obligation to maximize 
goodness, he did recognize a moral obligation to d o  as much good as we 
have contracted, promised or “undertaken” to do. It is appropriate t o  
use moral sanctions t o  prevent people from “omitting to  d o  such good 
as they have undertaken.”46 Mill recognized the negative utility of even 
this obligation, again justifying its enforcement on the grounds of its 
connection with institutionalized practices and disappointed ex- 
pectations: 
When we either expressly or tacitly undertake to d o  more, we are bound to keep our 
promise. And inasmuch as every one, who avails himself of the advantages of society, 
leads others to expect from him all such positive good offices and disinterested services as 
the moral improvement attained by mankind has rendered customary, he deserves moral 
blame if, without just cause, he disappoints that e~pec ta t ion .~’  
The third important element in a proper utilitarian reply to Veatch on 
promise keeping may be introduced in relation to  the problem 
concerning promises to promote positive well being that are made in 
secret, especially where the promisee has died and it is certain that no one 
else knows that the promise has been made. Should the arctic explorer 
keep his promise to educate his compatriot’s children made when the 
compatriot gave him all his rations so that he alone could make it back 
to  civilization? Should the doctor keep death bed promises to  d o  good 
that he alone knows about? An affirmative utilitarian answer is based 
upon the fact that promise keeping is an institutionalized practice. 
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As we have seen, Mill recognized no general obligation to promote 
positive well being. Yet, he did acknowledge a special obligation to do 
good once we have “undertaken” or promised to do so. Even 
institutionalized practices like promise keeping may have legitimate 
exceptions written into them, however, a fact that Rawls failed to take 
into account. Would Mill have thought “except when no other living 
person knows about it” to be a legitimate exception to the rule of 
keeping promises to do  good? Well, in fact he did not recognize this 
exception, perhaps only because he did not discuss it. However, there 
are perfectly sound utilitarian grounds for not institutionalizing this 
exception. First of all, the very practice of making secret promises 
would be eliminated by such an exception. Yet, there are situations in 
which we would all want others to make secret promises to us that could 
be fulfilled only after our death. Such an exception would simply crush 
in advance our hopes for “such positive good offices and disinterested 
services.” It is just as harmful to crush hopes as to disappoint 
expectations. 
For Mill, moral right and wrong are identifiable only in relation to 
moral rules that are a part of a general social practice that includes both 
the inculcation and the coercive enforcement of desirable social rules. If 
the rule that “We should keep our secret promises to do good after the 
death of the promisee”is justifiable as a way of avoiding crushed hopes, 
this desirable institutional practice must be supported both by public 
opinion and a properly trained conscience for they too are essential 
parts of the practice. If Veatch’s or anyone else’s conscience hurts at the 
very thought of violating a secret promise, that is just as it should be on 
utilitarian grounds. Without some such sanction to help insure 
compliance this desirable institutional practice would not exist. 
The duty of promise keeping is very important to Veatch, being one 
of the five deontological moral principles which he believes to be 
justified without appeal to consequences.4* It lies at the heart of the idea 
of a contractual relationship between physician and patient, and it is 
involved in the medical profession’s promise of confidentiality to 
clients.49 We have seen that the social practice of promise keepingcan be 
justified on utilitarian grounds which do take adequate account of the 
fact that in the past a promise was made and which accords with a 
minimizing utilitarian obligation to prevent harm rather than a 
benevolent duty to optimize goodness. Mill’s utilitarianism has no 
difficulty in providing an adequate rationale for medical contracts and 
confidentiality commitments. 
There is one troublesome feature of Veatch’s deontological principle 
of promise keeping which is worth mentioning while on the subject, 
namely that one can read carefully through his whole book and not 
know exactly what it is. He never states it, just as he never states any of 
his five deontological principles, so we cannot look at it to determine 
whether he writes any legitimate exceptions into it or not. In one 
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discussion, he gives us a choice between opting “for the principle of 
promise keeping without exception” or “for the principle that promises 
should be kept unless it is beneficial (really beneficial, including long 
te rm consequences) t o  break the  promise,”50 his general anti-  
utilitarianism creates the presumption that he finally favors the first 
option. On the other hand, he recognizes at least one possible conflict 
between justice and promise keeping in which justice should prevail.51 
Thus he recognizes an  exception to a principle that has no exception! 
Telling us that when his deontological principles conflict, “We should 
opt for the course that produces the lesser violation of the non- 
consequentialist principles on ba1ance”Q does not help very much here 
since he does not tell us how to  recognize such lesser violations. Mill’s 
moral axiom would help here. It would be a considerable improvement 
on relying on Veatch’s attempts to balance deontological stringencies 
by intuition. It would generate exceptions to promise keeping that are 
openly acknowledged and justified and which are based on harm to 
people rather than on harm to abstract principles: We should not keep 
our promises when, all things considered, it seems likely that keeping 
them would result in even greater harm to others and an  even greater 
violation of their rights t o  the minimal essentials of any sort of well 
being whatsoever. None of these minimizing obligations involve moral 
obligations to produce the best consequences, only to  prevent the worst 
and provide the minimum. 
Part 111: Veatch on Penal and Distributive Justice 
(4) Veatch’s two final objections to utilitarianism both pertain to 
issues of justice. First there is the charge that utilitarianism generates 
the wrong results with respect t o  penal justice, then with respect to 
distributive justice. The difficulty with respect to penal justice, as 
Veatch states it, is that utilitarianism implies “that punishment should 
be meted out on the basis of the consequences rather than on the basis of 
who deserves the punishment.”53 This is also a commonplace objection, 
though Veatch does not elaborate upon it. The point seems to be that 
utilitarianism is committed to punishing innocent persons if the 
greatest good or happiness of the greatest number could be thereby 
promoted. There are a number of things wrong with this objection, 
however, especially as applied to J. S. Mill. 
The first and most obvious response is that although there may be 
some very simplistic versions of utilitarianism which would coun- 
tenance punishing the innocent for the good of the greatest number, this 
objection is totally irrelevant to Mill’s minimizing utilitarianism. There 
is no moral obligation to  maximize goodness, only to minimize harm 
and provide minimally essential goods, in Mill’s theory of moral 
obligation. Thus there is no moral obligation to d o  anyrhing, much less 
punish the innocent, merely because the good would be maximized 
thereby. It must be admitted,  however, that  there is a n  initial 
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presumption that even a minimizing utilitarianism is committed to 
punishing the innocent if thereby even greater harm could be prevented. 
It is this presumption which needs careful scrutiny. 
The most obvious reason why minimizing utilitarianism is not 
committed to  punishing the  innocent for the  greater good of 
others is purely conceptual in nature, namely that this is simply not 
what we mean by “punishment.” Even John Rawls, a severe critic of 
utilitarianism, realized that utilitarians have a quick and  easy 
conceptual escape from this difficulty. He indicated that “utilitarians 
agree that punishment is t o  be inflicted only for the violation of the law. 
They regard this much as understood from the concept of punishment 
itself.”54 Mill clearly thought that the institution of punishment was 
justified partly because it “restores the mind” of the offender to  a 
“normal preponderance of the love of right,” but primarily as a way of 
protecting “the just rights of others against unjust aggression by the 
offender.”55 He logically linked the concept of punishment to the notion 
of offence, i.e. of “wrong doing,” “guilt,” or “wrong c0nduct.”5~ Its 
future-looking purposes of correcting and deterring offenders cannot 
be fulfilled for logical reasons unless there are offenders. We cannot 
correct someone who has not made a mistake or  deter someone who is 
not likely to make a mistake. Since punishment is by definition the 
infliction of harm by a proper authority upon a person who has violated 
the rules, and since a n  innocent person is by definition one who has not 
violated the rules, the very idea of “punishing the innocent” is thus 
logically self-contradictory. Veatch’s commonplace objection to  utili- 
tarianism is itself unintelligible. 
Of course, as Rawls indicated, a subtle problem remains for 
utilitarianism even if we acknowledge that the very idea of “punishment 
the innocent” is logically incoherent: “The real question, however, is 
whether the utilitarian, in justifying punishment, hasn’t used arguments 
which commit him to accepting the infliction of suffering on  innocent 
persons if it is for the good of society.”57 Such a practice would not be 
punishment, but we might call it “telishment,” Rawls suggested.58 Yet, 
upon examination, Rawls concluded that even a maximizing utilitarian 
would not want to pay the price of establishing and socially enforcing 
such a practice, that “If  one pictures how such an  institution would 
actually work, the enormous risks involved in it, it seems clear that it 
would serve no useful purpose. A utilitarian justification for this 
institution is most unlikely.”59 
We must remember that for Mill an  act is morally obligatory only if it 
is authorized by a moral rule, i.e. by what Rawls would call a “practice.” 
Even a maximizing utilitarian would not want to adopt a rule which 
says that “We should inflict harm on innocent persons if greater good 
for others would result.’’ The minimizing counterpart, however, would 
be that “if and only if  nothing but harm will come of it no matter what 
we do, we should inflict harm on persons (whether innocent or not) only 
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if greater harm for others may thereby be prevented.” Put into the 
language of rights, “we should violate the rights of individual persons 
only where this is necessary to  avoid a n  even greater violation of the 
rights of others, who are also individual persons.” We should call this 
“minishment” to distinguish it from both punishment and telishment. 
This is just another way of presenting the “lesser of two evils”princip1e. 
It is precisely on this principle of minishment and not on any 
maximizing principle, that Jeremy Bentham actually justified the 
institution of punishment, writing that “all punishment is mischief all 
punishment in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at  all 
t o  be admitted, it ought only to  be admitted in as far as it promises to 
exclude some greater evil.”60 Whatever our  moral intuitions may be 
with respect to this minishment rule of harm prevention, they should be 
evaluated quite independently of any rule which enjoins harming to  
maximize positive good. Contrary to  Veatch’s suggestion, neither 
Bentham nor Mill believed in punishing or otherwise harming persons 
in order to maximize good consequences, but they would have 
supported the societal adoption of rules and /  or exceptions to rules, 
which allow individuals to be harmed if and only if, all things 
considered, even greater harm to and violation of the rights of others is 
likely thereby to  be avoided. Mill’s examples best expressed this idea of 
minishment when he wrote that “particular cases may occur in which 
some other social duty is so important as to overrule any one of the 
general maxims of justice. Thus to save a life it may not only be 
allowable, but a duty, t o  steal o r  take by force the necessary food or 
medicine, or to  kidnap and compel to officiate the only qualified 
medical practitioner . ’’61 
Though his instances of harm may not go quite far enough, even 
Robert Veatch thinks that violations of medical confidentiality are 
justified on the grounds of harm prevention, writing that physicians 
“should pledge confidentiality except when there is a clearly identified, 
direct, and immediate threat t o  life or grave bodily harm to another.”62 
Veatch’s own solution to the problem of exceptions to the rule of 
confidentiality is thus throughly utilitarian! 
( 5 )  Veatch’s final objection, the one with respect t o  distributive 
justice, is “that the distribution of the benefits and harms counts for 
nothing in the concept of justice except as it has a n  impact on total 
aggregate consequences.”63 “Having a n  impact” here means “max- 
imizes,” for Veatch has just explained on the preceding page that the 
real difficulty with respect to distributive justice is that utilitarianism 
“justifies too  much. By itself, it justifies any scheme that produces the 
greatest net aggregate benefit.”b4 Veatch conceded that the principle of 
marginal utility would tend heavily to equalize the distribution of 
benefits in a utilitarian social order because 
i t  is usually the case that people who are in great need will benefit more from a fixed 
amount of resources than those who are relatively well off. Usually, marginal utilityfrom 
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a given amount of a resource decreases as  the amount of need decreases. In aggregating 
benefits, those effects will be correctly taken into 
Nevertheless, a grave difficulty remains for maximizing utili- 
tarianism. As Veatch sees it, “it justifies too much,” i.e. 
it would justify the Nazi experiments if only the Nazis were clever enough to design an 
experiment that would produce great good for the masses while harming a small number 
of people in such a way that the aggregate net good was enhanced. If enough people 
receive the benefits, it is plausible that even enormous harms to a small number will be 
outweighed by the aggregate benefit to the masses.66 
Veatch expressly intends that this objection should apply to Mill, for 
in the same paragraph he wrote that “There is, according to Mill and his 
followers, no  means of resolution of conflicts over distribution except 
the utilitarian, the one that compares aggregate impacts of al- 
ternatives.”b7 Now it is true that Mill believed that the Principle of 
Utility should be appealed to  directly, both when moral rules conflict 
and when exceptions to  moral rules need to be made. As we have seen, 
however, a moral application of the Principle is not a maximizing 
application. What a moral appeal to the Principle tells us is that we 
should act on that rule, or make those exceptions, which minimize 
harm, including those harms which result when the basic rights of 
individuals are violated. As Mill himself explained, 
I account the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and incomparably 
the most sacred and binding part, of all morality. Justice is a name for certain classes or 
moral rules which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are 
therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rulesfortheguidanceof life; and the 
notion which we have found to be of the essence of the idea ofjustice-that of a right 
residing in an individual-implies and testifies to this more binding obligation. 
The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which we must never 
forget to include wrongful interference with each other’s freedom) are more vital to 
human well-being than any maxims, however important, which only point out the best 
mode of managing some department of human affairs.68 
Harmful acts against some individuals calculated to  increase positive 
good for others, which Veatch believes to be required by utilitarian 
morality, turn out to be the very kinds of act that utilitarian morality 
forbids! Veatch and other deontologists who think that deontology has 
some kind of monopoly on human rights and  that utilitarianism cannot 
make a place for them have simply never taken the trouble to  read and 
understand the concluding chapter of Mill’s Utilitarianism. 
There are, of course, many other difficulties with respect t o  
distributive justice, though the specific difficulty raised by Veatch is 
easy enough to  resolve. Worth mentioning in conclusion is the problem 
that in ou r  society and  in the writings of our  philosophers there is no 
such thing as justice, there are only justices. By this I mean that anyone 
who pays careful attention to how the term justice is defined by 
philosophers and plain men will discover that there are available many 
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oft en incompatible concepts of dis t ri bu t ive j us t ice and correspondingly 
many often incompatible intuitions of justice. We must choose among 
them somehow. Mill realized this and identified more than a half dozen 
concepts of justice in the concluding chapter of his Utilitarianism. 
Recently, after examining the gross incompatibilities between justice- 
according-to-Rawls and justice-according-to-Nozick, Alasdair Mac- 
lntyre concluded that “we have all too many disparate and rival moral 
concepts, in this case rival and disparate concepts ofjustice, and that the 
moral resources of the culture allow us no way of settling the issue 
between them rationally.”@ For anyone who has read Mill, the 
recognition that we have many rival and disparate concepts ofjustice is 
nothing new at all. To those who complained that utility was “an 
uncertain standard” but that justice was not, Mill replied that 
there is as much difference of opinion, and as much discussion, about what is just as about 
what is useful to society. Not only have different nations and individuals different notions 
of justice, but in the mind of one and the same individual, justice is not some one rule, 
principle, or maxim, but many which d o  not always coincide in their dictates.’O 
Veatch himself acknowledged and discussed the rivalry bet ween 
Rawlsian maximin justice and the more egalitarian theory of justice 
which he favors.’’ He apparently thinks that we can choose between 
rival concepts of justice by consulting the deontological intuitions of 
rational persons, but this does not work at all for me. I can think of at 
least twelve distinct and often incompatible concepts of social or 
distributive justice; and when I consult my intuitions, even in my most 
rational moments, I find that I have intuitions of justice corresponding 
to almost every last one of them! I suspect that any honest person will 
have the same difficulty! Consider the following definitions which 
various philosophers have championed. Social or distributive justice or 
fairness consists in: 
1. Finding and staying in one’s proper place in the social order. 
2. Contracting not t o  harm others in exchange for not being harmed 
3. Distributing benefits t o  those who deserve to get them. (Aristotle) 
4. Distributing liberty and other primary goods so as  to optimize 
benefits for the least advantaged, with no consideration of desert or 
merit. (John Rawls) 
5 .  Distributing good things only to those who are entitled to have 
them through having obtained them by free contracts, gifts or 
exchanges, in an overall just social system. (Robert Nozick) 
6 .  Distributing benefits so as to  maximize the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number. (Maximizing utilitarianism) 
7. Distributing benefits so that each gives according to  his ability and 
gets according to his need. (Karl Marx) 
(Plato) 
by them. (Epicurus) 
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8. Upholding the institution of private property. (David Hume) 
9. Treating similar cases in similar ways. (Henry Sidgwick) 
10. Distributing benefits so as to equalize net welfare for all. 
(Egalitarian theorists) 
11 .  Giving all persons an equal opportunity to obtain equal benefits. 
(Robert M. Veatch) 
12. Equal societal protection from harm and provision of minimal 
essential goods for all. (J. S. Mill) 
What is needed, obviously, is some way of choosing between such 
rival concepts of justice and the intuitions with which they correlate. I 
shall not confront the issue, raised by Maclntyre, whether reason can 
resolve ultimate disagreements in ethics. I will conclude by pointing out 
that disagreements concerning concepts and intuitions of justice need 
not be regarded as ultimate disagreements, for a more basic principle of 
value can be introduced to resolve disagreements about concepts of 
justice. Mill asked “Who shall decide between these appeals to 
conflicting principles of justice?” and answered, not who, but how: 
“Social utility alone can decide the preference.”?Z The view of justice 
which Mill thought to be most in accord with a moral application of the 
Principle of Utility was neither a maximin theory which says distribute 
the largest possible number of good things to  the least advantaged nor 
an egalitarian theory which says distribute an equal number of good 
things to everyone. The only socially enforcable theory ofjustice worth 
the price is a minishment theory which says distribute t o  everyone 
equally according to their capacity to  use them those minimal essentials 
of well being which we identify as rights and judge to  be so fundamental 
to well being that they are worth the price of strong measures of coercive 
societal protection on every particular occasion. 
With this I rest my case against Veatch and my defense of Mill against 
his objections. My minimal verdict is that persons searching for an  
adequate theory of ethics upon which to ground the particularities of 
medical ethics should not reject utilitarianism, at least not for any of the 
reasons Veatch has given. * 
*Writing of this article was supported by a Summer Research Grant from the 
University of Tennessee. I t  was given as  the Presidential Address to the 1985 meeting of 
the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology in New Orleans. 
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